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The impact of cultural similarities and differences on performance in 
strategic partnerships: an integrative perspective 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This theoretical research endeavors to find common ground in the ostensibly 
inconsistent results of studies on the impact of cultural similarities and differences on 
strategic partnerships. Some findings suggested that partners have to possess similar 
cultural characteristics in order to achieve success while others showed that cultural 
distance had a positive effect on efficiency and the competitiveness of partnerships. This 
paper systematically analyzes the equivocal evidence of influence of both commonalities 
and differences on partnerships’ outcomes, highlighting conditions under which they can 
be either beneficial or dysfunctional. Several propositions are formulated in regard to the 
role of qualitative and quantitative differences in both organizational and national 
cultures. Further, the theoretical and practical implications are also discussed. 
Keywords: Strategic Partnerships, Cultural Similarities, Cultural Differences. 
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             Introduction 
The steady rise of international partnerships such as strategic alliances, 
international joint ventures (IJVs) and selling partnerships is one of the prominent 
features of the process of globalization. Academics and practitioners have acknowledged 
that national and organizational culture plays a critical role in the success of partnerships 
across borders. Moreover, culture is regarded as one of the major causes of the high 
failure rate of strategic alliances. There is a general consensus in the literature that a 
cultural fit between partners should exist in order for their collaboration to succeed. 
However, neither the nature of this fit or the direction of cultural influence has been fully 
understood, due to the inconclusive results of empirical research. Some authors argue that 
partners have to possess similar cultural characteristics in order to achieve success, and 
the wider the cultural gap is between them the worse the performance (Lane & Beamish 
1990; Schneider & De Meyer 1991; Sirmon & Lane 2004). Similar results were reached 
in the study of another type of inter-organizational relationship – mergers and 
acquisitions (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Lubatkin et al. 1999; Thomsen 1996). Ostensibly the 
sound practical prescription that stems from these results is to find a partner as culturally 
close as possible in order to avoid inter-group conflicts, withholding information, distrust 
etc. At the same time, other findings have led to the opposite conclusion. Park and 
Ungson (1997), contrary to their initial hypothesis, found that the duration of 
international joint ventures had a positive correlation with national-cultural distance and 
that U.S.–Japanese partnerships were less likely to dissolve than U.S.–U.S. ones. Results 
reported by Pothukuchi et al. (2002) showed that national cultural distance had a positive 
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effect on efficiency and the competitiveness of joint ventures of Indian firms with foreign 
partners. Research of mergers and acquisitions also brought some authors to conclude 
that larger cultural distance is associated with better performance (Krishnan et al. 1997; 
Morosini et al. 1998). These findings imply that cultural fit may not necessarily mean 
being alike – it may mean being complementary, i.e. different from each other. The 
explanations for these contradictory results have involved the multilevel nature of culture 
(Teerikangas & Very 2006), the conceptual and methodological properties of the cultural 
distance construct (Shenkar 2001), or the incongruence between economic and 
psychological performance (Pothukuchi 2002). Though these arguments are certainly not 
without merits, there are also other reasons for these inconsistent findings. This paper 
endeavors to find common ground and present additional explanations to the ostensibly 
contradictory results in studying the impact of similarities and differences in both 
organizational and national cultures on strategic partnerships. The paper is focused on 
strategic partnerships; however, its conclusions can be applied mutatis mutandis to other 
forms of inter-organizational relationships, such as mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Equivocal role of cultural differences and similarities in partnerships 
As a possible middle ground between opposite positions, some researchers 
maintain that partners have to be similar in certain characteristics but different in others. 
Sarkar et al. (2001) argue that the performance of an alliance will be high when two 
partners are culturally similar and at the same time possess different, i.e. complementary 
resources and capabilities. Indeed, being similar in cultural values and norms on the one 
hand and obtaining complementary resources would probably be the best situation for the 
partners. However, this line of thinking separates resources from culture, which makes it 
 4 
simplistic. Though culture and resources are distinct concepts, there is a connection 
between them. Organizational resources, capabilities, and skills present the outcomes of a 
firm’s unique historical path and experience. The same is true regarding organizational 
values and norms. Much like skills, they result from organizational learning which has 
selected certain norms, routines, and practices that work for a particular organization, and 
rejected those that do not. Repetition and the gradual improvement of daily routines and 
practices allow a company to move through a learning curve while simultaneously 
accumulating capabilities that enhance its performance and reinforcing and 
institutionalizing functional norms.  
Practices and routines are often referred to as artifacts of organizational culture, in 
which values and norms are reflected (Rousseau 1990; Beugelsdijk et al. 2006). Barney 
(1986) regards organizational culture as a source of competitive advantage which, like 
any other resource, is characterized by the degree of its value, rareness and inimitability. 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2006) propose a link between organizational culture and 
organizational, particularly relational skills. We can expect that an organization with 
more organic culture would develop such capabilities as innovativeness, flexibility, 
responsiveness etc, while a more mechanistic organization might excel at timely delivery, 
accuracy, reliability etc. Hence in order to have different and complementary resources 
two partners are destined to have different cultural traits as well. In that regard, partners’ 
different cultural attributes are inevitable and represent the 'necessary evil' of a 
partnership.   
The roles of both similarities and differences regarding an alliance’s performance 
are not unequivocal. Parkhe (1991) pointed out that when one partner learns from another 
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and acquires certain attributes that were lacking at the outset, he has fewer incentives to 
stay in the relationship and the alliance can be easily dissolved. Hence, a growing 
similarity may disrupt the partnership rather than improve it. This point underscores the 
difference between a merger and an alliance. While in a merger one culture may be 
absorbed by another culture and does not sustain, in alliance both cultures continue to 
coexist. Growing similarity as a result of cultural integration or assimilation (Nahavandi 
& Malekzadeh 1988) solves the problem of cultural gap for a unified company; 
conversely, two much commonality in a partnership may create problems. Further, when 
two companies are too much alike in the first place, partnership between them simply 
will not emerge because they tend to possess similar resources and capabilities and do not 
need each other. Therefore, difference or diversity is not only inevitable but essential and 
may be called 'mother of alliance'.  
On the other hand, all complementary attributes stem from differences but not all 
differences create complementarities. Parkhe (1991), addressing global strategic 
alliances, divided possible asymmetries between two partners into Type I and Type II 
diversity. The first one is productive and reflects the reciprocal strengths and 
complementary resources that facilitate effectiveness. The second one threatens the 
functioning of an alliance and its longevity. This typology may be accepted as a useful 
framework and starting point for further deliberation. First of all, there exists Type III 
diversity – irrelevant differences. Some cultural asymmetries just do not matter since they 
do not have impact on an alliance’s performance. Sirmon and Lane (2004) argue that 
differences between partners that are not close to value-added activities and to alliance 
purposes do not affect outcomes of the alliance. Smith and Barklay (1997) found that 
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perceived organizational differences between selling partners played only a modest role 
in partner perceptions of trustworthiness and none had a meaningful impact on the 
perceived task performance. Johnson et al. (1991), in their analysis of international joint 
ventures of Japanese companies, pointed out that deviation from Japanese culture had no 
effect on the Japanese partner’s perceptions of partnership’s success. Bianchi (2006) 
showed that cultural differences do not affect the level of trust and commitment of 
exchange relationships between foreign suppliers and Chilean distributors. In practical 
terms, investing heavily in analyses of variation that do not impact actual results would 
be a waste of resources on the part of partners. Therefore, a preoccupation with 
differences, especially labeling them as cultural gaps that have to be necessarily bridged, 
can be counterproductive. The ability of managers of both firms to identify asymmetries 
that do not matter is an important skill that allows partners to concentrate on issues that 
make a real difference.  
As for the distinction between Type Ι and ΙΙ diversity, it raises certain questions: 
are these categories of 'good' and 'bad' asymmetries stable and consistent among different 
alliances that involve certain organization? If company A possesses cultural feature X 
and this feature is productive in alliance with partner B, does that mean that it will be 
productive with other partners? Are these types also consistent among alliances that 
involve different organizations?  If cultural feature X constitutes Type I diversity in the 
interaction between companies A and B, will it remain as such in an interaction between 
companies C and D? For instance, Pothukuchi et al. (2002) in their analysis of joint 
ventures of Indian firms with foreign partners found that masculinity gaps had a 
consistently positive effect on all performance measures. In contrast, Shenkar and Zeira 
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(1992) found masculinity to have an adverse impact in international joint ventures, via 
the increase of the role ambiguity of CEOs. In addition to that, in the very same 
interaction between firms A and B it can be the case that cultural feature X has both 
positive and negative sides, i.e. it is necessary and useful but creates problem at the same 
time. For instance, consider the alliance between an organic firm with high R&D 
capabilities that has to develop new products and a more mechanistic company which is 
good at lean manufacturing and is supposed to produce these products efficiently. 
Apparently these companies possess complementary resources (Type I diversity). On the 
other hand, differences in levels of centralization, formalization, and participation in 
decision making will almost inevitably impede communication and create conflicts (Type 
II diversity). Therefore certain overlap between these types occurs even in the same 
partnership. Moreover the same cultural trait may have a positive effect on some aspects 
of performance and a negative effect on others. Pothukuchi et al. (2002) showed that the 
impact of individualism and uncertainty avoidance was favorable on economic outcomes 
of IJV (efficiency and competitiveness) but unfavorable on socio-psychological outcomes 
(satisfaction). Therefore the typology of asymmetries being a useful framework does not 
constitute strict categorization. Consequently, we need to apply a contingency approach, 
establishing belongingness of certain cultural traits to one of diversity types. 
At the same time cultural relativity should not be exaggerated. Any asymmetry in 
some cultural characteristics invariably pertains to counterproductive Type ΙΙ diversity. 
That means that certain cultural values and norms of two partners ought to be or even 
must be similar. For example, it is difficult to see how gaps between partners in attitudes 
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towards quality improvement can become functional in an alliance. If one party does not 
take quality seriously, the situation unequivocally represents Type ΙΙ diversity. 
 Researchers have pinpointed various cultural gaps that should be bridged in a 
partnership. A list of the features of required similarities that does not pretend to be 
exhaustive includes cultural sensitivity as ability to accept differences (Voss et al. 2004), 
reputation and goals’ horizon (Smith and Barclay 1997), open communication (Mohr & 
Specman 1996; Pothukuchi et al. 2002), the importance of an alliance for both sides and 
the involvement of senior management which reflects an overall cooperative stance 
(Toulan et al. 2007), ability to learn (Crossan & Inkpen 1995), common strategic 
direction, and continuous improvement in quality (Lo & Yeong 2004). Some of these 
similarities are desired characteristics; others are absolute musts without which an 
alliance cannot be sustained. In other words, some differences impair an alliance’s 
performance; others constitute a constraint to its existence or longevity.  
It is noteworthy that among the cultural characteristics mentioned above both 
partners have not only to be similar to each other, but what is more important is that they 
have to manifest conformance to expectations, i.e. to be close to a desired level of such 
characteristics. For instance, if two partners are alike in that they do not pay much 
attention to customer satisfaction or the continuous improvement of quality, it is hard to 
expect success from their alliance. By the same token, a high level of trust and a 
performance ensuing from it will not emerge when both partners are short-term oriented 
opportunists and engage in negative behaviors such as withholding critical information, 
misrepresenting facts, committing inappropriate resources etc.  In these instances of 
commonality, though there is no difference between the actual norms of either side, there 
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is a significant gap between their actual norms and desired norms, or normative 
expectations (Killman et al 1985; Veiga et al. 2000). When such a gap exists the cultural 
similarity between alliance members will be dysfunctional. These considerations lead to 
the following proposition concerning cultural similarity: 
 
P1. Among similar cultural norms of partners, the gap between actual norms and 
desired norms will be negatively associated with a partnership’s performance. 
 
As far as productive Type Ι diversity is concerned it is warranted to point out that 
positive differences constitute more multifaceted phenomena than just one category, i.e. 
they comprise a few subtypes. The first one that was mentioned earlier is the most 
frequently referred to in the literature and reflects complementary resources and skills 
that allow both sides to overcome limitations and close the gaps of organizational 
capabilities. The second subtype of positive differences is more subtle and as a result less 
explored in research. It goes beyond the mere pooling of complementary resources and 
addresses the complementarities of cultural attributes in that they mutually reinforce each 
other’s strengths. A winning combination of cultural dimensions makes them work at 
their full potential. Morosini et al. (1998) examining the impact of national cultural 
distance on acquisition performance described the combination of certain traits of Italian 
culture and other European cultures. In one instance, a Swedish company transferring 
team-based and non-hierarchical ways of working to Italy created conditions for boosting 
Italian creativity and innovation. In the old hierarchical and individualistic context these 
positive traits of Italian culture were underutilized. Though this research addresses 
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acquisitions and national cultures, the same principle applies to other modes of inter-
organizational relationships, as well as organizational cultures. Hence this category of 
productive cultural distance generates positive synergy not just between resources per se 
but also between certain aspects of culture of both sides. 
The third subtype of positive differences represents a situation in which one of the 
partners perceives certain attributes of another partner’s culture as more attractive than 
his own.  Another culture becomes the source of admiration. Pothukuchi et al. (2002) in 
their analysis of IJVs of Indian companies with foreign partners found that a difference in 
masculinity showed a consistently positive effect on all organizational outcomes. The 
authors concluded that 'there might be an admiration effect on the part of Indian 
managers who attributed higher IJV performance to their foreign partners’ aggressive 
pursuit of economic success' (Pothukuchi et al. 2002: 244) — the very attribute that was 
lacking in their own culture. When one side has a high regard of a different culture it 
helps it to adopt constructive behaviors, routines and repertoires (Morosini et al. 1998) 
which enhance performance. Unlike the previous subtype of Type Ι diversity, cultural 
influence here is not reciprocal but rather one-sided and the side that adopts new norms is 
the main benefactor. However, there is also a common element in these two scenarios 
which is appreciation or even admiration of another culture’s attributes. In the second 
subtype in order to create synergy of different cultural norms both sides have to perceive 
them favorably. Mutual high evaluation of one another’s norms is a prerequisite to 
cultural cross-fertilization. This aspect distinguishes cultural influence within separate 
firms and in inter-organizational relationships such as partnerships. Within a company, 
culture is often unclear to its members and is taken for granted. (Schein 1985). 
 11 
Organization members follow certain norms in almost automatic fashion without much 
deliberation –'this is the way things are done around here'. In contrast, in a strategic 
alliance in order to accept the cultural traits of another party, a company’s personnel has 
to understand the substance of these traits and intentionally apply them. If the cultural 
attribute of one partner is superior in relation to another, in order to become productive it 
should be perceived as such by another side. In case it is not appreciated and valued by 
members of another firm, a cultural difference will create conflict no matter how good 
objectively it is. Consequently, the evaluation of the other party’s cultural traits plays a 
moderating role between cultural differences and an alliance’s performance. When 
cultures are mutually appreciated, differences will lead to success; otherwise, cultural 
differences will create cultural conflict and hamper performance. These arguments lead to 
the following proposition: 
 
P2: The evaluation of a partner’s cultural traits moderates the relationship 
between cultural differences and an alliance’s performance: a positive evaluation is 
associated with high performance; a negative evaluation is associated with low 
performance. 
 
As follows from the previous analysis, the impact of both cultural similarities and 
differences has a certain common denominator. In both cases in order to be productive 
cultural attributes have to be perceived favorably, i.e. as close as possible to normative 
expectations or ‘ought to be’ levels (Veiga et al. 2000). Closeness to the desired level of 
cultural values, norms and other cultural traits is probably more crucial than the closeness 
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of these traits of two partners to one another. On the one hand, if both sides possess the 
same positive norms, it results in boosting the performance of an alliance. On the other 
hand, when both sides are different in culture and possess disparate positive cultural 
features that are appreciated by their partners, it boosts an alliance’s performance as well. 
This integrative perspective between similarities and differences may at least partially 
explain the inconsistent results of the previous research that were mentioned earlier in the 
paper. Some studies have concluded that cultural distance has an adverse impact on an 
alliance’s success, while others have argued that cultural distance contributes to its 
success. It might be that these ostensibly opposite conclusions are simultaneously correct: 
both similarities and differences may have favorable outcomes. However, the critical 
point has been missing so far: what matters most is that both similar and dissimilar traits 
should be as close as possible to ‘ought to be’ level, and seen as such by the another 
party.  
In synthesis, there are four possible combinations in interaction between partners’ 
cultural attributes, two of which refer to similarities with the other and two refer to 
differences; two of them describe a positive situation and two depict a negative situation: 
1. Both sides possess the same cultural features that are close to the ‘ought to be’ 
level. This is the situation of positive similarity that leads to an alliance’s success. There 
is no basis for cultural conflict. Both sides have no difficulties in communication and the 
level of trust is high. This scenario can be labeled 'cultural harmony'.                                                                                                                       
2. Both sides possess similar attributes but they are far from the ‘ought to be’ 
level. There is a short cultural distance between the actual values and norms of each side 
but there is a wide gap between them and desired values and norms. The scenario at hand 
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is far from being harmonious. Since both sides are engaged in opportunistic behaviors, 
the level of communication and trust is low. They are in conflict, even maybe at each 
other’ throats, but this conflict is not cultural in nature. Two parties behave in a like 
manner but behave inadequately. This situation can be labeled 'opportunistic rivalry'. 
3. Two partners are different in their culture but differences are appreciated or 
admired. There is an understanding that another culture possesses features that are 
desirable and productive, i.e. close to ‘ought to be’ level. 'We' are lacking a certain 
attribute that 'they' possess and it is a good idea to learn and adopt it. This learning can be 
mutual when either partner possesses asymmetric virtues, or one-sided when one partner 
highly values a particular attribute. Cultural distance here is positive and does not 
constitute a ‘gap’. This scenario can be labeled 'cultural learning'. 
4. Two partners are different in a way that one is close to ‘ought to be’ level, and 
the other is far from it. Since most cultures involve a certain degree of ethnocentricity, 
focal culture is often regarded closer to ‘ought to be’ level then others’ culture. Norms 
and values are incompatible; the level of communication and trust is inappropriate. This 
is negative situation of cultural gap and conflict and can be labeled as such. All four 
scenarios are presented in Table 1. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Quantitative differences between partners. 
So far this paper has focused on the qualitative aspect of cultural differences 
among partners. However there is another facet of distance – a quantitative one. It refers 
to the size of the distance between the alliance members. The quantitative component 
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itself may be divided into specific and compound, or aggregate. Specific distance 
concerns quantitative difference in certain particular characteristic of national culture, 
e.g. masculinity, uncertainty, or of organizational culture such as attention to details, 
teamwork orientation, result versus process orientation etc.  
It may be argued that depending on the magnitude of difference, certain features 
of counterproductive Type ΙΙ asymmetry can be an impediment or a constraint for an 
alliance. For instance, when one of the partners is somewhat higher on the dimension of 
reliability than the other one, but the size of the gap is not considerable, this Type ΙΙ 
diversity represents an obstacle but does not threaten the existence of a partnership. 
However, after a certain threshold point, such a difference becomes intolerable and 
partnership can no longer sustain. In a case when a specific difference becomes a 
constraint, the size of overall distance does not matter –one specific gap will disrupt an 
alliance. We also can speculate that whether a certain particular attribute belongs to 
certain type of diversity depends on the magnitude of a difference. A particular attribute 
might take an inverted U-shaped configuration, that is boosting performance up to a 
certain point while being within the 'tolerance zone' of both partners (Type Ι diversity), 
and then impede it more and more, i.e. turning eventually to Type ΙΙ diversity.  
 Compound distance is the total difference in all traits of the national and 
organizational culture between partners. It is an aggregate sum of attributes that belong to 
different diversity types and have different shapes. As a result, the behavior of compound 
distance depends on the weight of the diversity Types Ι, ΙΙ or ΙΙΙ and is difficult to predict. 
At the same time, some generalizations can be made. The most obvious assumption is 
that the bigger the weight of productive Type Ι diversity, the bigger the compound 
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distance that has a positive impact on the performance of an alliance. However, since 
Type Ι diversity traits take the inverted U-shaped form, that is they cease to affect an 
alliance favorably after a certain point, compound distance should also resemble an 
inverted U-shape. Too big of an overall gap in organizational and national culture will 
invariably have a disruptive impact on a partnership. Further sections address compound 
distance in both cultural layers. 
 
            Organizational culture distance 
Turning away from national culture for the time being I will now focus on 
organizational culture’s effect on partnership performance. There are different 
approaches in the literature to measure overall organizational culture (see e.g. Chatterjee 
et al. 1992; Veiga et al. 2000). The most suitable model for the purpose of this paper is 
the competing values model developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983). This seminal 
framework is designed along two dimensions: flexibility vs. control preference for 
structure and internal vs. external focus. Applying this model, Deshpandé et al. (1993) 
identified four organizational culture types: clan, adhocracy, market and hierarchy. These 
four types create the following grid: 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
           Clan culture is characterized by cohesiveness, loyalty, participation, and 
teamwork. Organizational cohesiveness and morale are more important than financial and 
marketing objectives. Adhocracy culture stresses entrepreneurship, innovation and 
creativity. Finding new markets and new directions for growth through flexibility and 
 16 
risk taking is the main criterion for effectiveness. Hierarchy culture stresses order, rules, 
and regulations. It strives towards consistency and achievement of clear goals. Market 
culture is goal-oriented rather than people-oriented. It emphasizes competition and 
market superiority. Types that are located in adjacent cells along horizontal or vertical 
lines differ from each other in one dimension – internal-external or organic-mechanistic. 
Conversely opposite types that are located along diagonal lines (clan vs. market and 
hierarchy vs. adhocracy) differ from each other in both dimensions. Consequently 
distance between types along diagonals is larger than between types along vertical and 
horizontal lines. The smallest cultural distance is between companies that find themselves 
within the same cell. 
 Applying previous logic to this framework we may infer that the compound 
distance between firms along diagonal lines is too big for their alliance to be successful. 
They are far from each other on too many characteristics and can hardly find a common 
denominator. Even if they possess complementary resources with potential for synergy, 
barriers for communication can become insurmountable. In contrast, companies that are 
located in adjacent cells have more in common; they possess both differences and 
similarities. As a result they will experience fewer difficulties in their interactions. For 
instance the alliance between an organic firm specialized on R&D and a mechanistic 
manufacturing firm has more chances to succeed and sustain when they both have same 
external orientation rather than different orientations. On the other hand, companies that 
belong to the same type and are located in the same quadrate are too similar and do not 
possess sufficient amount of complementary resources. Organizations that are not 
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different enough do not need each other and consequently are less prone to form an 
alliance. These arguments lead us to the following propositions: 
 
P3. Alliances that are formed between partners from adjacent cells of the grid 
will have a higher level of performance than alliances formed between partners that are 
located along diagonals of the grid. 
P4. Firms that belong to different cells of the grid are more likely to create an 
alliance than firms that belong to the same cell. 
 
These theoretical speculations have clear practical implications. Managers 
looking for potential partners have to choose a company that finds itself in an adjacent 
quadrate of the matrix rather than in an opposite one.  
 
            National and organizational cultural distance 
Considering national culture in our analysis clearly makes the issue of cultural 
distance more complicated. Partners that belong to different nations deal with double-
layered acculturation – multifaceted interplay between national and organizational 
cultures. The 'total' cultural distance between them combines two elements- national and 
organizational cultural gaps. Since national and organizational cultures belong to 
different levels of analysis, there is a danger of confusion between these levels, which 
represents a methodological error of ecological fallacy. This, beyond obvious complexity 
of simultaneous study of cultural distance at both layers might be a possible reason why 
most of past research on partnerships focused on one level of culture – either 
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organizational or national. There are difficult issues that are still understudied within the 
research. We have to approach measuring the total cultural difference without stepping 
into a trap of ecological fallacy. Consider an alliance between firm A with an adhocracy 
culture in low uncertainty avoidance and a low power gap national culture and firm B 
with a hierarchy culture in high uncertainty avoidance and a high power gap national 
culture. Are they culturally more distant than two companies with adhocracy and 
hierarchy organizational cultures within one national culture? Another question is which 
of the cultural distances –national or organizational – is most critical for the success of an 
alliance? In order to answer these questions we need to address the relationship between 
two levels of culture – a subject that attracts increasing attention of researchers. 
National culture affects earlier stages of socialization (Hofstede 1990) and is more 
deeply anchored in individuals’ minds than organizational culture which corresponds to 
the secondary socialization process (Teerikangas & Very 2006). Hofstede (1980) found 
that core national values explain 50 per cent of the differences among work related value 
patterns. He also pointed out that founders’ national values are reflected in the values of 
their organizations (Hofstede 1985).   
The dimensions of national culture influence various characteristics of 
organizations. Power distance impacts the amount of hierarchy, the degree of 
centralization, and the amount of participation in decision-making (Punnet & Ricks 1992; 
Newman & Nollen 1996). Organizations in high uncertainty avoidance cultures such as 
France tend to be more hierarchical and formalized then low uncertainty avoidance 
cultures such as UK (Crozier 1964; Lubatkin et al. 1998). Different combinations of 
dichotomized dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power gap produce a grid 
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involving four organizational culture types: adhocracy, hierarchical bureaucracy, family, 
and well-oiled machine (Hofstede 1985). This matrix strongly resembles previously 
discussed competing-values model. (Quinn & Rohrbaugh 1983; Deshpandé 1993). Along 
these lines, collectivist national culture makes it easier for a company to adopt teamwork. 
Masculine national culture leads to result-oriented culture that develops managerial 
practices such as management by objectives (Newman & Nollen 1996). Without 
multiplying the instances of the effects of national culture on organizational culture we 
may fairly suggest that organizational culture stems from national culture. Moreover, 
though there is variation of organizational cultures within each national culture the mean 
organizational culture in certain nation would reflect national culture. That is, the 
distance between two mean organizational cultures in two countries will mirror 
differences in national cultures. Hence, in assessing the total cultural distance between 
them there is no point in combining two scores of differences because it will imply 
double counting. Consequently, an adhocracy culture in low uncertainty avoidance and 
low power gap environment is not necessarily more distant from a hierarchy culture 
within an environment with opposite characteristics than two companies with these two 
organizational cultures within the same country. National cultural features can be 
reinforced or partially outweighed by organizational features. In sum, there are three 
theoretical possibilities in interaction between two levels of culture: 
       1. As noted, organizational cultures close to the average characteristics of certain 
nations will reflect national cultures and so will organizational cultural distance among 
them. Organizational level does not add significantly to cultural gap. Since French firms 
are more formalized than British due to higher uncertainty avoidance, distance among 
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French and British companies with average national degree of formalization will replicate 
the difference in uncertainty avoidance (and probably other national dimensions that 
influence formalization but not yet discovered by researchers). 
       2. Organizational culture may reinforce or accentuate the cultural distance between 
countries. If firm C scores more than average on teamwork within collectivistic national 
culture and firm D represents an extremely individualistic, competitive, 'lone-wolf' 
culture within an individualistic national culture, the total cultural gap between them will 
be greater than the national cultural distance. By the same token, an extremely 
mechanistic organization in a high power gap and high uncertainty avoidance national 
culture will be farther from an exceptionally organic company in low power gap and low 
uncertainty avoidance environment. 
       3. Organizational culture may at least partially neutralize national cultural distance 
when national and organizational forces work in opposite directions. An American 
company with strong propensity towards teamwork is closer to Japanese companies than 
the average American organization. A French company with a below average level of 
formalization will be less distant from British firms than the majority of French 
companies.  
Since among three scenarios the total cultural distance is the smallest in the third 
one, it is the most favorable situation for international partnership; the most unfavorable 
state is the second one because the cultural gap may become too wide, disrupting the 
cooperative effort among partners. If the parties involved assess the situation in the 
manner that falls into the second scenario, they may be advised not to create an alliance 
in the first place. In the first scenario managers have to concentrate most of their attention 
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on national culture level because it will have the most significant impact on performance; 
as for organizational features, their role will be less critical. Conversely, the farther a 
certain firm is mapped from average national characteristics, the more paramount 
organizational culture will be. Thus, the relative influence of the two levels of culture 
depends on whether an organizational culture is remote from the mean of the country’s 
characteristics. This line of arguments leads us to the following proposition: 
P5. The larger the distance of organizational cultures from mean national 
characteristics, the stronger the impact of organizational cultures on alliance 
performance relatively to national cultures. 
 
Practical steps in managing cultural differences and similarities 
The last issue that is addressed in the paper is how companies manage existing 
differences and similarities. Differences in the beginning of relationships should be 
considered as input which may be altered by the deliberate or unintentional activities of 
the parties involved. Schweiger and Goulet (2005) pointed out that little research has 
examined interventions to manage cultural differences in mergers and acquisitions. The 
same theoretical void takes place regarding strategic partnerships. Among practical 
measures that allow partnership avoiding failure and achieving synergistic effect are the 
following: personal interaction, socialization, and training of alliance managers (Das and 
Teng 1998); quality information exchange (Voss et al. 2004); cultural leadership 
involving keeping the momentum of the change process and attention to everyday 
mundane details (Bligh 2006); deep-level as opposed to surface-level cultural learning 
(Schweiger & Goulet 2005). The stated objective of these steps is 'bridging', 'spanning' or 
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'reconciling' differences between partners. However, what remains unclear is the meaning 
of this reconciliation. Are these interventions aimed at the reduction of cultural distance 
within an alliance? National cultural distance certainly cannot change in interaction 
between two partners, so the focus is on organizational culture distance. In the event that 
cultural interventions are successful, partners can attain the following results: 
     1. A clear understanding of the similarities and differences in vis-à-vis cultures 
without the distraction of biases, misunderstandings and stereotypes. Schweiger and 
Goulet (2005) found that deep-level cultural learning results in perceiving fewer cultural 
differences than in conditions of surface-level cultural learning or lack of cultural 
learning. More objective picture cleaned from distortions means that there is minimal gap 
between perceived and actual cultural distance. Consequently the outcome of cultural 
learning is the reduction of perceived cultural distance, not necessarily the real one.   
    2. Finding overarching values such as the quality of customer service that enable 
overcoming more superficial differences (Bligh 2006). Such deep values have to be 
formulated clearly and actively communicated to employees of both sides. Defining 
overarching values reveals commonalities between partners that existed in the beginning 
of the process and achieves the same result – deeper understanding and more objective 
view of similarities and differences, i.e. minimum distortions in perceived cultural 
distance.  
    3. The higher appreciation of other’s cultural traits, treating them as valuable assets 
that promote alliance’s success. This implies that vis-à-vis traits are perceived favorably 
as close to 'ought to be' level. Positive appreciation of different cultural features is a basis 
for cultural synergies discussed earlier in the paper. Partners are aware of and accept 
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differences between them; they do not behave ethnocentrically and do not try to impose 
their culture on a partner. Again, this does not mean reduction of cultural distance in 
alliance. The outcome is the broadening of cultural 'tolerance zone', i.e. viewing a 
partner’s culture as lying within acceptance limits of one’s culture. 
   4. Active steps aimed at the change of old and creation of new common routines, norms 
and eventually values that in fact lower cultural distance in alliance. Bligh (2006) pointed 
out the importance of combining the best practices of two members. Integrating the best 
practices which should be regarded as artifacts of an emerging culture can lead eventually 
to creation of new norms and values. That is the most difficult and least studied aspect of 
managing of cultural differences. One of the perils is that pushing similarity beyond a 
certain optimal level can be counterproductive. Striving for similarity may lead to 
compromises in which both members abandon their preferred problem-solving 
approaches and effectively eliminate a significant amount of their tacit knowledge 
(Sirmon & Lane 2004). Emulating the cultural behaviors of another partner can backfire 
(Francis 1991). Madhok (2006) argues that a conflict among partners, if handled 
properly, plays a positive role in that it tests the resolve and strengthens the resilience of 
the relationship. 
Members of a partnership that are pushed too far towards similarity can fear the 
loss of identity. This phenomenon can explain the paradoxical results of the study by 
Scweiger and Goulet (2005), who found that though deep-level cultural learning 
increased understanding and reduced perceived cultural differences between partners, it 
failed to enhance acceptance of a partner’s culture. The possible reason for such 
paradoxical finding is that despite reducing misperceptions and biases, cultural learning 
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may also trigger better understanding and appreciation of one’s own cultural norms that 
were taken for granted so far. Members of partnership become more aware not only of 
similarities but of real differences as well and they deem them meaningful and worthy to 
stick to.  
In conclusion, this study attempts to fill certain gaps in research of the impact of 
cultural similarities and differences in strategic partnerships. Finding common ground in 
seemingly inconsistent results of previous studies provides deeper insight into the 
complex dynamics between the cultural characteristics and an alliance’s performance.  
These findings have important theoretical and practical implications. I formulated several 
propositions regarding both commonalities and differences in national and organizational 
culture that should be verified empirically. That can be a fruitful direction for future 
research. Managerial implications that stem from this research include the understanding 
of  the equivocal roles of cultural similarities and differences, each of which can have 
both a positive and negative impact on alliance; recommendation to avoid pushing too far 
for similarities which can diminish partners’ capabilities and be counterproductive; 
caution against creation of alliances with companies representing opposite types of 
organizational culture and advice for looking for potential partner with commonality in 
either external – internal focus or mechanistic – organic processes; in the international 
arena seeking for partners whose organizational cultural characteristics at least partially 
outweigh national cultural differences and reduce overall culture distance.   
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Table 1: Combinations in interaction between partners’ cultural attributes 
 
Partner A ('Them') 
 
Partner B ('Us') Outcome 
Close to ‘ought to be’ level 
 
Close to ‘ought to be’ level 
 
Cultural Harmony 
Far from ‘ought to be’ level 
 
Cultural Learning 
Far from ‘ought to be’ level Close to ‘ought to be’ level Cultural Conflict 
 
Far from ‘ought to be’ level 
 
Opportunistic Rivalry 
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Table 2: Typology of organizational cultures 
 
                                                    Organic processes 
                                       
                                      Mechanistic processes 
 
 
 
Internal 
maintenance 
 
                 
             Clan      
             
 
 
     Adhocracy 
 
 
 
External              
positioning                                             
          Hierarchy 
 
 
 
        Market 
